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Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
LANCE JOHNSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 44193
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR 2011-14619
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-two-year-old Lance Johnson pleaded guilty
to felony money laundering. The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with five years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for
a period of four years. Mr. Johnson subsequently admitted to violating his probation,
and the district court went beyond the recommendations of the parties by revoking
probation and executing a modified unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts the district court when it revoked his probation, abused
its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Kootenai County Sheriff’s Department deputies initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle
for speeding. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) A deputy contacted the
driver and sole occupant, Mr. Johnson.

(PSI, p.2.)

The deputy noted the vehicle

smelled strongly of air freshener, there were multiple air fresheners in the vehicle, and
Mr. Johnson had difficulty getting his license and insurance information because of
shakiness. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Johnson opened the center console when asked for the
vehicle’s rental agreement, revealing cash wrapped in a rubber band. (PSI, p.2.)
The deputies asked Mr. Johnson to step out of the vehicle to accept his written
citation, and Mr. Johnson acted very nervous.

(PSI, p.2.)

Mr. Johnson reportedly

denied being in possession of contraband but admitted to having $1500 in the console.
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Johnson gave consent to search the vehicle, and a deputy found drug
paraphernalia with residue in the console. (PSI, p.2.) The deputy eventually found
OxyContin, marijuana, paraphernalia, and a total of $45,782 of cash in the vehicle.
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Johnson later reportedly admitted he had been travelling from Minnesota
to Oregon to purchase drugs. (PSI, p.2.)
The State charged Mr. Johnson by Information with one count of money
laundering, Idaho Code § 18-8201, one count of attempted trafficking in marijuana,
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1),

one

count

of

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine), I.C. § 37-2732(c), one count of possession of a controlled
substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3), and one count of possession of paraphernalia,
I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.56-58.)
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Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Mr. Johnson agreed to plead guilty to
money laundering, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts. (See R., p.60.)
The district court accepted Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea. (R., p.60.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, suspended the sentence,
and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for a period of four years. (R., pp.66-71.) After
about a year, Mr. Johnson transferred his supervision to North Dakota. (See PSI, p.31.)
About one-and-one-half years later, the district court issued a Bench Warrant on
the basis that probable cause existed to believe Mr. Johnson was in violation of his
probation by committing new crimes. (R., p.74.) The Bench Warrant was served about
two years later. (See R., p.75.)

In the intervening period, Mr. Johnson had been

incarcerated in North Dakota and then paroled. (See Tr., p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.4.)
Mr. Johnson initially entered a denial to the alleged probation violation.
(R., p.77.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Johnson subsequently agreed to admit to
violating his probation by pleading guilty in North Dakota to the new crimes of five
counts of possession of a controlled substance, Class C Felony, one count of
possession of a controlled substance, Class B Misdemeanor, one count of possession
of drug paraphernalia, Class C Felony, two counts of possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance “marijuana”, Class B Felony, one count of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, Class A Felony, and one count of ingesting a
controlled substance, Class A Misdemeanor. (R., p.78; Tr., p.4, L.18 – p.10, L.4; see
PSI, pp.31-46.)

The district court accepted Mr. Johnson’s admission.

Tr., p.10, Ls.5-6.)
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(R., p.78;

The State recommended Mr. Johnson serve 180 days total for the violation and
be sent back to North Dakota. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5.) The State informed the district court
that, based on conversations with defense counsel, its understanding was North Dakota
would be required to accept Mr. Johnson back if the district court ordered him on
probation because of the parole status there. (Tr., p.13, Ls.6-10.) The State further
explained Mr. Johnson apparently “did two years of prison and he was then released. It
appears that he probably did a good prison term and was early released on parole,
according to what my understanding is from the parole officer.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) The
State requested that the district court impose 180 days of jail and then place
Mr. Johnson on probation for a new period of six years. (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-25.)
Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel indicated Mr. Johnson had been sentenced to
five years in prison in North Dakota but was paroled after serving two years. (See
Tr., p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.4; see also PSI, pp.36-40, 42-45 (North Dakota criminal
judgments imposing five-year sentences on Mr. Johnson).) Defense counsel also told
the district court “that because Mr. Johnson is already in a parole status in North
Dakota, the state of North Dakota has a mandatory acceptance of the interstate case.”
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-8.)

Defense counsel did not know what the Idaho Department of

Correction’s stance would be.

(Tr., p.18, Ls.8-11.)

Defense counsel further

emphasized Mr. Johnson was “on parole now in North Dakota and that he has virtually
no connection to Idaho. His only connection to Idaho ever, you know, going back in this
case was that he drove through the state.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.21-25.) Thus, Mr. Johnson
requested the district court impose 180 days of jail and commute the sentence, or
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alternatively consider the State’s recommendation to impose some jail time and place
him back on probation. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.14-19, p.20, Ls.7-13.)
The district court stated, “I disagree with the plea agreement today. I don’t think
reinstating you on probation is the appropriate sentence.

I certainly don’t think

commuting is the appropriate sentence.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-13.) The district court did not
believe reinstatement on probation would adequately protect the community or deter
others. (Tr., p.22, Ls.15-21.) Thus, the district court went beyond the recommendations
of the parties by revoking Mr. Johnson’s probation and executing a modified unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.80-81.)
Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment on
Probation Violation. (R., pp.82-85.)
ISSUE
Did the district court, when it revoked Mr. Johnson’s probation, abuse its discretion by
ordering into execution his modified unified sentence of ten years, with three
years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court, When It Revoked Mr. Johnson’s Probation, Abused Its Discretion By
Ordering Into Execution His Modified Unified Sentence
Mr. Johnson asserts the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its
discretion by ordering into execution his modified unified sentence, because the district
court could only reasonably conclude from his conduct that probation was achieving its
rehabilitative purpose.

The district court should have instead followed the

recommendations of the parties by either imposing 180 days of jail and then commuting
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the sentence, or alternatively imposing 180 days of jail and then placing Mr. Johnson
back on probation.
“A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho
102, 105 (2009). Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation
revocation proceeding. Id. at 105. First, the appellate court reviews the district court’s
finding on “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.”

Id. “If it is

determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id.
Mr. Johnson concedes he admitted to violating his probation. (R., p.78; Tr., p.4,
L.18 – p.10, L.4; see PSI, pp.31-46.) When a probationer admits to a direct violation of
his probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.

State v.

Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus, this Court may go to the second
step of the analysis and determine whether the district court abused its discretion when
it revoked Mr. Johnson’s probation.

The district court may revoke probation if it

reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its
rehabilitative purpose. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The
district court may consider the defendant’s conduct both before and during the
probationary period. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
Here, the district court could only reasonably conclude from Mr. Johnson’s
conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose. The consensus among
the parties was that Mr. Johnson seemed to have served a “good prison term” in
North Dakota. As defense counsel discussed during the probation violation disposition
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hearing, his staff had been in contact with Mr. Johnson’s parole officer, John Knudsten.
(See Tr., p.10, Ls.20-23, p.11, Ls.17-21, p.17, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Knudsten was apparently
unavailable to testify telephonically at the hearing. (See Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) Defense
counsel told the district court Mr. Knudsten had not seen Mr. Johnson’s file himself, but
“he’s familiar with the prison system out there. And he knows that if Mr. Johnson got
five years of prison, but got out in two that Mr. Johnson must have done rather well
while incarcerated . . . .” (Tr., p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.5.)
Similarly, the State told the district court, “[a]pparently, [Mr. Johnson] did two
years of prison and he was then released. It appears that he probably did a good prison
term and was early released on parole, according to what my understanding is from the
parole officer.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) The State’s recommendation for 180 days jail time
followed by probation took into account “that he served two years in prison in the
meantime on top of that.” (See Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.)
Additionally, North Dakota would be required to accept Mr. Johnson if he were
placed on probation in this case because of his parole status in North Dakota.
Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel stated, “[b]ut as far as North Dakota’s correctional
system is concerned, that’s a mandatory acceptance. They have to accept an interstate
compact from Idaho to North Dakota because he is in parole status.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.1216.) Defense counsel also noted Mr. Knudsten had indicated he was willing to accept
Mr. Johnson back on an interstate probation. (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-19.) Thus, defense
counsel suggested the district court could impose 180 days jail time and then commute
the sentence so that “Idaho can just clean its hands of Mr. Johnson and leave him to
whatever fate he has in North Dakota.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-18.)
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Further, defense counsel informed the district court Mr. Johnson “has virtually no
connection to Idaho. His only connection to Idaho ever, you know, going back in this
case was that he drove through the state. That’s it.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-25.) Defense
counsel asserted commuting the sentence would “impose[] some punishment and it just
severs the connection, what little connection there is.” (Tr., p.19, L.18 – p.20, L.1.)
Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel continued: “This case is really the only connection
Mr. Johnson has to the State of Idaho and in an odd way, you know, if he were to go
and do prison and then be released on parole and have to remain in the State of Idaho
that might cut against some of the goals of sentencing. Arguably.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-6.)
In light of the above, the district court could only reasonably conclude from
Mr. Johnson’s conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose. Thus,
Mr. Johnson submits the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its
discretion by ordering into execution his modified unified sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
revoking probation and remand the case to the district court for entry of an order
imposing 180 days of jail and commuting the sentence, or alternatively an order
imposing 180 days of jail and placing Mr. Johnson back on probation.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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